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Introduction 
It is often argued[1] that the post-1973/74 expansion in military expenditures 
undertaken by the Persian Gulf states has led to competition between the military 
and civilian sectors for skilled labour. Furthermore, military expenditures are 
said to have pre-empted funds that might otherwise have been allocated to 
education and the improvement of human capital. It is argued that, as a result, 
military expenditures in the region tended to frustrate the oil exporters' ambitious 
economic development programmes, especially those of the less-populated oil-
exporting countries. 
Another view was originally presented by Stephanie Neuman[2, p. 588] in 
her analysis of the situation in pre-revolutionary Iran. According to Neuman, 
some of the skills taught by the military benefit the civilian sector. As she points 
out, however, a question still remains as to: 
. . .how one would distinguish between the military and the civilian costs and benefits. What 
is the net balance over the long and short term? Furthermore, how are the skill levels related 
to the kinds of military technology imported? Does more technology demand higher skills 
and, therefore, indirectly upgrade the educational level of the country? Instead, does it draw 
away needed skilled manpower from the civilian sector?[2, p. 589]. 
Clearly the ability of these countries to adapt to changing and, in most cases, 
more austere economic environments will depend in large part on how effectively 
they took advantage of the abundant revenue years to increase the education 
and skills of their domestic workforces. 
The purpose of this article is to address the question of whether military 
expenditures in the Arab world have been made at the expense of national human 
resource development. Based on this analysis, several implications are drawn 
as to the dynamics of human capital development in that region of the world. 
Manpower Shortages and Government Expenditures 
Human capital accumulation can be stimulated in developing countries through 
public education expenditures as well as Government spending on health and 
other social services. Clearly governments are the most important agencies 
in this area and can do much more than private enterprises could ever hope 
to achieve. 
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Government initiative in this area has expanded in recent years with Arab 
countries as a whole increasing their educational expenditures as a percentage 
(see Table I) of GNP from 3.87 per cent (1974) to 5.47 per cent (1987)[3]. Health 
expenditures have not shown such a dramatic increase, however, increasing 
from 1.39 per cent of GNP (1974) for the Arab countries to 1.72 per cent (1987). 
A similar pattern was observed for the non-Arab countries, spending less than 
their Arab counterparts for each of the years examined but slightly more (as 
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On the other hand, the governments of developing countries also have extremely 
strong commitments to military expenditure to bolster security and counter 
threats. Aggregated defence expenditure is almost always state-induced and 
the consumption of scarce resources to support the military as well as 
reallocation of valuable inputs into arms production must generally be provided 
for in the national budget. In terms of general magnitudes, Arab countries 
expanded their allocations to defence from 7.87 per cent in 1974 to 12.39 per 
cent in 1985, only to contract to 10.03 per cent in 1987. Militarization in the 
non-Arab countries has not been nearly so dramatic, with defence expenditures 
in these countries increasing from 3.01 per cent in 1974 to 3.71 per cent in 1984 
and 3.93 per cent in 1987. 
In short, concurrent with rapid economic growth in the Arab world, a relatively 
large share of resources has been allocated to the military. For the Arab region 
as a whole military purchases have been partially financed by oil revenues and 
by military aid and grants from the major industrial country arms suppliers. 
Lebovic and Ishaq[5, p. 107] have noted that, while absolute regional military 
spending has been phenomenal, the military also controlled a greater percentage 
of the central Government budget in the Middle East — twice as much of the 
national output as in other developing countries or in the world as a whole. 
Middle Eastern defence accounted for one-third of the military spending of 
developing countries and almost one-half of world arms imports. During the 
1973-82 period, the average annual economic growth rate for the individual Middle 
Eastern states was about 6 per cent, while military expenditures grew by 
approximately 13 per cent per annum. Although military expenditure levels vary 
greatly across countries, in a great majority of the countries the growth rate 
of military spending outpaced economic growth. This indicates a striking trend 
in the region towards higher military burdens (military expenditures as a ratio 
of gross domestic product)[5, p. 107]. 
As Lebovic and Ishaq[5, p. 107] point out, besides the simple guns-versus-
butter trade-off, economic theory does not unambiguously indicate whether 
a higher military burden retards or promotes economic growth. As noted earlier, 
empirical evidence on the subject has become the focus of considerable 
controversy. In this regard, Charles Wolf[6] has noted: 
Military and paramilitary forces can contribute to economic development by their contributions 
to internal and external stability. Moreover, the real economic costs imposed by the military 
on developing countries can be reduced to the extent that these forces provide training, 
construction, technological and industrial spill-overs that contribute to economic growth. 
Evidence in support of both of these propositions is provided by the experience of several 
of the successfully modernizing countries during the past decade. 
Along these lines, Weede has found considerable empirical support for the 
proposition that increased military participation rates increase overall economic 
growth[7, p. 17]: 
In my view, the positive effect of military service on the economic performance should be 
explained as follows: the military teaches discipline and creates a useful habit of obeying orders. 






and effective than elsewhere, since there is a perceived need to be on the alert against foreign 
enemies. Moreover, the higher the military participation ratio, the more young men acquire 
discipline and obedience. That is why I regard the military participation ratio as a discipline-
related indicator of human capital formation, why I suggest to broaden the notion of human 
capital formation so as to include abilities and discipline. 
Clearly, the Arab world, given its relatively low levels of human capital formation, 
should be one of the areas most receptive to this link between military 
expenditures, military participation, human capital formation and economic 
growth. 
However, in their study of the relationship between defence burdens and 
growth in the Middle East, Lebovic and Ishaq[5, p. 136] found in general the 
relationship was negative for the non-oil-exporting countries, but that no 
statistically significant pattern existed for the total sample (17 countries). The 
negative finding is consistent with those obtained by Frederiksen and Looney[8], 
who make a distinction between resource-constrained and resource-abundant 
countries. 
Given the small sample sizes of oil producers in the Middle East, Lebovic 
and Ishaq were not able to test for any potential positive relationships between 
defence expenditures and economic growth, a relationship found by Frederiksen 
and Looney[9,10,11] for larger samples of developing countries. These positive 
relationships have, however, been identified through time-series analysis for 
selected countries and over periods of time. 
For example, in the case of Saudi Arabia it was found that[12]: 
(1) In general, military expenditures have had a net positive impact on the 
country's overall gross capital formation. That is, after controlling for 
Government expenditures and oil revenues, increases in military 
expenditures have had a net stimulating effect on investment in the 
Kingdom. The same also applies to non-oil investment. Here, however, 
the strength of defence expenditures was low compared with that of 
Government investment. 
(2) Military expenditures do not appear to stimulate either total private-sector 
expenditures or consumption. Again Government investment appears 
particularly productive in contributing to increased levels of private-sector 
consumption. 
(3) Military expenditures do not appear to induce levels of imports nearly 
so much as do the overall levels of Government expenditures or oil 
revenues. 
(4) Interestingly enough, military expenditures appear to induce private-
sector investment, whereas Government investment seems to crowd out 
or pre-empt resources that might otherwise flow towards this sector. 
(5) On average, military expenditures appear to contribute more to overall 
demand than does Government consumption. The stimulating effect of 
military expenditures on other types of Government expenditures tends 
to reinforce this effect. 




In short, military expenditures in the Saudi Arabian context appear to have 
(in addition to their security value) a number of significant impacts on the private-
sector, not all of which are negative. In particular, several of the major areas 
of private-sector activity appear to derive more of a stimulus from particular 
Government expenditures than from other types of public allocations. The same 
also appears to apply to the overall level of gross capital formation and non-oil 
investment. 
In addition, these results suggest that a careful shifting of Government 
allocations from public-sector consumption to capital formation (providing that 
profitable areas for investment have not been exhausted), rather than across-
the-board reductions in military expenditures, is the most productive policy 
open to the authorities for contributing to private-sector expansion. 
In a slightly different context, it has been suggested that excessive defence 
expenditures led to the economic instability preceding the Iranian Revolution. 
While this argument sounds quite plausible, research by Neuman noted above 
together with several cross-section studies[9,11] have reached the counter-
intuitive conclusion that Iran may have actually derived a number of beneficial 
economic impacts from allocations to the military. However, cross-sectional 
analysis looks at only one point in time, and hence its results are always sensitive 
to the dates chosen for examination. 
To assess if time-series analysis provides a different perspective on the impact 
of the country's military expenditures, another time-series study[13] attempted 
to quantify the impact of military expenditures on the Iranian economy over 
the 1959-77 period, and in particular the consequences associated with the rapid 
military build-up undertaken by the Shah in the mid-1970s. 
The main findings of this study suggested that, while a case could be made 
that the economy received positive net benefits from defence expenditures in 
the 1960s, this relationship broke down in the 1970s, with added military 
expenditures, perhaps through the bottlenecks they created, having a negative 
impact on a number of sectors and types of capital formation. Interestingly 
enough, these negative effects were not systematically associated with other 
types of Government expenditures, indicating that the Government's allocations 
to defence were unique in their marginal negative impact on private-sector output 
after the 1973/74 revenue boom. 
Again, these findings are consistent with cross-section analysis, which indicates 
that resource-constrained countries generally experience negative impacts from 
military expenditures, while those not constrained by foreign exchange and/or 
domestic savings are capable of experiencing positive impacts from increased 
allocations to defence. 
Looking at the impact of military expenditures from a different perspective, 
that of labour scarcity, Cummings et al.[1, pp. 38-49] note that labour shortages 
in the Gulf states, created by expanded military expenditures, may be a far 
greater long-term impediment to growth in the region than any effects associated 
with the diversion of capital or foreign exchange to military activities. In a 
somewhat similar manner, Mousad[14] found that a 10 per cent reduction in 






$12.9 billion — would increase education expenditures by around $8.1 billion 
per year. 
Along these lines, Deger[15] estimated that a 15 per cent reduction in the share 
of the military spending ratio, i.e. from 6.3 per cent of gross domestic product 
to 5.4 per cent (approximately $13 billion in absolute terms) would increase the 
allocation of funds to education by about $4.5 billion a year. These estimates were 
made for developing countries as a whole, with no distinction made between 
countries as being resource-abundant or resource-constrained, labour-abundant 
or labour-scarce and so on. 
The purpose of the analysis below is to extend several strands of the analysis 
surveyed above. Specifically, we are primarily interested in examining the Arab 
states, a set of countries characterized as generally having (by Third World 
standards) very high military burdens (defence expenditures as a percentage of 
gross national product) together with lower than average levels of human capital. 
In addition we are interested in determining whether and to what extent military 
expenditures act independently of total Government expenditures in affecting human 
capital development in the region. Finally, are the linkages between military 
expenditures and human capital development in the Arab world fundamentally 
different from those experienced in other parts of the developing world? If so, why? 
Framework for Analysis 
The main measurable variables pertain to allocations to defence, Government 
expenditures and public education that generate human capital. In her study of 
education/defence trade-offs Deger[15] used the share of education in gross national 
product as a proxy for human capital development. This measure is rather arbitrary, 
and it is not clear from the theoretical literature whether human capital formation 
is best measured as an input (financial) or as an output (in terms of learning 
attainment, attendance, etc.[16]). In a broader sense human capital also includes 
factors such as health/medical care, etc. 
To avoid these definitional problems, factor analysis was used to develop a 
composite measure of human capital[17]. As a preliminary step, the factor analysis 
was performed on a sample of socio-economic measures developed by Ruth 
Sivard[4]. To obtain some sense of variations over time, the years 1974, 1977, 1980 
and 1987 were selected for the factor analysis. 
A second step involved including the military participation rate (armed forces 
per capita) in the factor analysis[18]. Here we were interested in determining the 
extent to which military participation was competitive with or complemented human 
capital development[19]. This preliminary examination of our total sample of Third 
World countries[20] produced several interesting patterns (see Tables II and III): 
(1) For 1987 (the last year for which comparable data were available) three[21] 
main factors were identified: human capital, public expenditure and' a 
dimension reflecting the share of national resources allocated to education. 
The human capital factor comprised largely performance measures — literacy 
rates, teachers; and to a lesser extent health — physicians per capita. 
(2) At this time (1987) the military participation rate (armed forces per capita) 
was only weakly loaded on human capital and public expenditures. That 




is, countries that had higher levels of military participation did not have 
significantly higher levels of human capital development or resources 
allocated by the national authorities. 
(3) The same picture emerged in 1980, with the military participation rate 
again associated with human capital development and public expenditure. 
The factor loadings on this date were, however, somewhat higher than 
those observed in 1987. 
(4) In contrast the 1970s (1974, 1977) saw the military participation rate largely 
associated with public expenditures. That is countries that had high levels 
of public expenditures were apparently able also to afford committing 
relatively large numbers of their populations to the military. 
(Factor loadings) 
Variable 
Total sample of countries, 1987 
Literacy rate, males 
Literacy rate, females 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Armed forces per capita 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Health expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Health expenditure/GNP 
School age population in school 
Educational expenditure/GNP 
Eigenvalues 
Total sample of countries, 1980 
Literacy rate 
School age population in school 
Percentage women in university enrolment 
School age population per teacher 
Physicians per capita 
Teachers per capita 
Armed forces per capita 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 




























































































Note: Based on data from[4] (Washington: World Priorities 1991); statistical work based 
on an oblique factor rotation using the varimax procedure in SPSS/PC + Statistics 4.0 (SPSS, 
Chicago, 1990). 
Table II. 
Patterns of Human 
Capital Formation and 
Military Participation, 








Total sample of countries, 1977 
Literacy rate 
School age population in school 
Percentage girls in high school 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Health expenditure/GNP 
Armed forces per capita 
Health expenditure per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Educational expenditure/GNP 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Eigenvalues 
Total sample of countries, 1974 
School age population in school 
Literacy rate 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Health expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 

























































































Note: Based on data from[4] (Washington: World Priorities 1991); statistical work based 
on an oblique factor rotation using the varimax procedure in SPSS/PC + Statistics 4.0 (SPSS, 
Chicago, 1990). 
Table III. 
Patterns of Human 
Capital Formation and 
Military Participation, 
1977 and 1974 
The individual country factor scores[22] associated with each of the major 
dimensions (factors) in the data provide some indication of the relative attainment 
of these dimensions by the individual sample countries: 
(1) In general the Arab Gulf countries have had relatively large public 
expenditures, although their educational commitment over time has not 
been particularly large, relative to Third World countries as a whole. 
(2) The Gulf states have also had significant improvements over time in their 
human capital development. 
(3) These two patterns are present in the other Arab countries, but to a 
somewhat lesser extent. 
In general these results suggest that improved human capital development may 
be affected by factors other than increased educational expenditures and/or 




educational commitment. Given these patterns and since the Arab countries 
have significantly larger military participation rates than their non-Arab 
counterparts, an additional factor analysis was performed separately on each 
group of countries. Our intent here was to assess to what extent Arab countries 
have differed from their non-Arab counterparts in their relative use of military 
participation and programmes in the armed services as an instrument in 
improving human capital development — particularly the component associated 
with improved levels of literacy. 
The results of the factor analysis (see Tables IV, V and VI) identified several 
interesting relationships[23]: 
(1) As of 1987 (Table IV) the Arab countries showed a strong pattern between 
the military participation rate (armed forces per capita) and human capital 
development[24]. In contrast the military participation rate had a very 
low factor loading in the non-Arab countries. For these countries increases 
in the armed forces relative to population were largely associated with 
increased public-sector expenditure on a per capita basis. 
(2) In 1980 (Table V) the patterns observed in 1987 were somewhat weaker. 
However, the military participation rate in the Arab countries still loaded 
fairly strongly on the human capital dimension. Interestingly, while military 
participation loaded slightly stronger on the expenditure dimension, it 
had a negative sign. That is in the Arab world there was a strong 
association between the military participation rate and levels of literacy 
and improvement in the teacher-student/population ratios. However, 
increased military participation was not associated simply with higher 
levels of public expenditures per capita. Again the military participation 
rate in the non-Arab countries loaded highest (and positively) on the public 
expenditure dimension. 
(3) The Arab countries (Table VI) began the period under consideration (1974) 
with the military participation rate largely associated with the share of 
resources allocated to education (Deger's measure of human capital). 
At this time increases in the ratio of armed forces to population was not 
associated with human capital development or with the pattern of public 
expenditures per capita. In contrast the military participation rate in the 
non-Arab countries, as in subsequent years, was largely associated with 
other types of public expenditures per capita. 
Conclusions 
While it might seem intuitively obvious that shifting public allocations from 
military towards educational activities would accelerate human capital 
development and hence increase a country's long-run growth prospects (while 
in the case of the Gulf states reducing dependence on foreign workers), the 
results presented above suggest that this view is too simplistic. Admittedly, 
this generalization holds for most developing countries, but it does not appear 









Health expenditure per capita 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Physicians per capita 
Health expenditure/GNP 
Literacy rate males 
Literacy rate females 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Armed forces per capita 
Educational expenditure/GNP 




Literacy rate males 
School age population per teacher 
School age population in school 
Literacy rate females 
Teachers per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Armed forces per capita 
Health expenditure per capita 
Educational expenditure/GNP 
Health expenditure/GNP 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Eigenvalues 


































































































Note: Based on data from[4] (Washington: World Priorities 1991); statistical work based 
on an oblique factor rotation using the varimax procedure in SPSS/PC + Statistics 4.0 (SPSS, 
Chicago, 1990). 
Table IV. 
Patterns of Human 
Capital Formation and 
Military Participation, 
1987 
in the Arab world. For these countries, increases in the military participation 
rate appear to take place simultaneously with expended allocations to human 
capital. 
Based on the results presented above, one can only speculate as to the 
mechanism linking military expenditures and human capital formation in the 
Arab world. Given the shortages of skilled labour, particularly in the Gulf, 







School age population in school 
Literacy rate 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Percentage women in university enrolment 
Health expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Educational expenditure per capita 





School age population per teacher 
School age population in school 
Literacy rate 
Percentage women in university enrolment 
Teachers per capita 
Armed forces per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Health expenditure per capita 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Educational expenditure/GNP 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Health expenditure/GNP 
Eigenvalues 
























































































Note: Based on data from[4] (Washington: World Priorities 1980); statistical work based 
on an oblique factor rotation using the varimax procedure in SPSS/PC + Statistics 4.0 (SPSS, 
Chicago, 1990). 
Table V. 
Patterns of Human 
Capital Formation and 
Military Participation, 
1980 
governments in that region might assign a very high priority to attracting youths 
with a high potential for learning into the military services[25]. This could be 
accomplished by monetary and other incentives. However, since the skilled 
labour pool is so limited, the private sector might object to sharply increased 
competition. This is especially the case in the light of a dwindling number of 
qualified workers. 
A more likely situation is one where governments are subsidizing the education 
of increased numbers of civilians during periods of stepped-up military 
expenditures with the understanding that upon completion of training those 









School age population in school 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Literacy rate 
Physicians per capita 
Health expenditure per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Health expenditure/GNP 
Educational expenditure/GNP 




School age population in school 
School age population per teacher 
Teachers per capita 
Defence expenditure per soldier 
Educational expenditure per capita 
Physicians per capita 
Armed forces per capita 






















































































Note: Based on data from[4] (Washington: World Priorities 1977); statistical work based 
on an oblique factor rotation using the varimax procedure in SPSS/PC + Statistics 4.0 (SPSS, 
Chicago, 1990). 
Table VI. 
Patterns of Human 
Capital Formation and 
Military Participation, 
1974 
military to absorb the large volume of sophisticated weapons flowing into the 
region, while at the same time not requiring drastic increases in the number 
of foreign military advisers. 
This interpretation is consistent with the results obtained above. Given the 
relatively high shares of defence and education expenditures in the region (see 
Table I), allocations to both defence and education could increase fairly rapidly 
without either category experiencing significant changes in its share of the 
budget. Because of the low skill levels of the local populations in these countries, 
it is unlikely that rapid increases in the military participation rate could be 
absorbed without accelerated training programmes both within and outside the 
military. 
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